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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAWRENCE SCOTT ANDRUS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 42878
Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-2014-2897

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Andrus failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either
by imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon his conviction for
felony DUI, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

Andrus Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Andrus was convicted of felony DUI (two or more prior DUI convictions within 10
years) and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years
fixed. (R., pp.71-73, 281, 284, 313-18.) Andrus filed a notice of appeal timely from the
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judgment of conviction. (R., pp.335-37.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.320-21, 330-34.)
Andrus asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his status as a first-time felon
and his claim that “the district court failed to provide any valid rationale for why [his]
case warranted a prison sentence.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.) The record supports the
sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (two or more prior DUI convictions
within 10 years) is 10 years. I.C. § 18-8005(6)(a). The district court imposed a unified
sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory
guidelines.

(R., pp.313-18.)

At sentencing, the state addressed Andrus’ ongoing
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willingness to endanger the community by driving while intoxicated and the fact that, at
the time of sentencing in the instant case, Andrus still had an outstanding DUI charge in
Nevada for an incident in which he “caused a car accident.” (12/5/14 Tr., p.607, Ls.1014; PSI, p.20. 1) Contrary to Andrus’ claim on appeal, the state did not focus on a “belief
that Mr. Andrus was a member of too many religions” (Appellant’s brief, p.6); rather, the
state simply set forth its concern that Andrus was continuing his previouslydemonstrated manipulative behavior (see 12/5/14 Tr., p.607, Ls.6-10; p.626, L.25 –
p.627, L.3; PSI, p.28) by abusing the social services offered by various religious
denominations (12/5/14 Tr., p.609, L.9 – p.610, L.1). Specifically, the state indicated,
“[T]here is nothing wrong with adhering to more than one religion, but what is wrong is
that it appears to be taking advantage of others” (12/5/14 Tr., p.609, Ls.21-24).
Furthermore, while Andrus asserts that the district court’s decision to impose
sentence “appears to be entirely related to the court not liking Mr. Andrus’s attitude” and
that it was “unclear what part of his allocution the district court found offensive”
(Appellant’s brief, p.6), the district court made it clear that its decision was based on
Andrus’ refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal behavior, particularly his
continued justification and rationalization of his actions, which indicated he was not
“prepared to change” (12/5/14 Tr., p.627, Ls.6-8; p.628, Ls.9-10; p.629, Ls.13-15).
Indeed, Andrus denied committing any crime other than “misdemeanor public
intoxication” (12/5/14 Tr., p.616, Ls.18-20), indicating that his conviction for felony DUI
“testifies to the triumphs of untruths and conjecture” (12/5/14 Tr., p.616, Ls.14-17).

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Supreme
Court No. 42878 Lawrence Scott Andrus Confidential Exhibits.pdf.”
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At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable
to its sentencing decision and also set forth in detail its reasons for imposing Andrus’
sentence. (12/5/14 Tr., p.623, L.16 – p.630, L.9.) The state submits that Andrus has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached
excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix A.)
Andrus next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction
of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Andrus must “show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Andrus has failed to satisfy his burden.
Andrus provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion; he merely
reiterated his disagreement with the state’s sentencing comments. (R., pp.322-28.) On
appeal, Andrus again argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence
because his brother’s statements – which were discussed in the police report regarding
a separate charge against Andrus for violation of a no contact order (PSI, p.33) – were,
he claims, not credible since his brother allegedly has prior criminal convictions
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8; R., pp.324-25).

Because Andrus complained about his

brother’s credibility at the time of sentencing (12/5/14 Tr., p.618, L.10 – p.619, L.14),
this was not new information before the district court. Furthermore, it appears from the
district court’s statements – both at sentencing and in its order denying Andrus’ Rule 35
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motion – that the court gave very little, if any, weight to the state’s sentencing comments
regarding Andrus’ brother. (See 12/5/14 Tr., p.608, Ls.19-21; p.623, L.16 – p.630, L.9;
R., pp.330-33.) In its order denying Andrus’ Rule 35 motion, the district court articulated
the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for
denying Andrus’ motion. (R., pp.330-33.) The state submits that Andrus has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s
Order Denying Defendant’s I.C.R. 35 Motion without a Hearing, which the state adopts
as its argument on appeal. (Appendix B.) The state further submits that by failing to
establish his sentence was excessive as imposed, Andrus has also failed to establish
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Andrus’ conviction and
sentence and the district court’s order denying Andrus’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2015.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of September, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

1 i in court today. She's off on an all expense college
2 : paid scholarship to a college in Virginia. She wrote
3 · me this note before she left: I want you to know that
4 you have been a large part of my life since I have been
5 old enough to remember. I know that you are a good
6 person. I really do. Dad will keep us updated on some
7 : of the things happening in your life, and I am so
8 ! exceedingly glad to hear of the work and experiences
9 i you've had with our lord Jesus. I've always been
10 keepi11y you i11 my praye1s, and I appreciate your kind
11 words and well wishes. Virginia is going to be a huge
12 change for me, but I'm excited and ready. Have faith
13 and never give up hope. Much love and God bless.
14
I hope I have provided you with a somewhat
15 broader view of my life, Your Honor, apart from the
161narrow scope presented by the prosecution. In jail I
17i was given the courage to formally resign my membership
18 in the LDS organization. The decision has brought me
19 much peace.
20
For nine months I have remained sober,
21 obviously, In Jall. although I'm sure Your Honor hears
221occasionally about what's called squawking. I never
23: partook. Alcohol consumption has been given over to
24· Jesus Christ, and my life is in His hands. I stand
25i before you unemployed, indigent, in need of a left hip

L

1 : replacement, and without an earthly dwelhng, bun----- - i
2 · have a home in Christ.
·
3
Please know I accept with deep humility and
' 4 gratitude your sentence upon me. In the Psalms it is
5 written, because he loves me, says the Lord, l will
6 rescue him, I will protect him, for he acknowledges my
7 l name. I believe I have acknowledged Him, ,Jesus Chrii,t,
8 ' here in faith today. He has blessed me more than I
: 9 deserve.
i 10
Thank you for hearing me, Your Honor. I
11 appreciate your kind attention.
12
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Andrus.
13
Any reason, legal in nature, why sentence
14 should not be imposed today, Mr. Williams?
15(
MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor.
16
THE COURT: As the attorneys know in this case
i 17 and I want you to know, Mr. Andrus, decisions on
l 18 sentencing should be guided by objective decisions, not
I 19 subjective decisions. And mostly guided by the
20 statutory factors in Idaho Gode Section 19-2521, the
21 reasons for justifying probation versus the reason (or
22, justifying incarceration in the penitentiary. And as
23: you heard me say to one of the last gentlemen, you were
24 in court here watching sentencing, the factors I have
: 25 to look at under just general policy considerations are
622 1

1 re a ilitatlOn components, the concept or oeterrence
2 both as to you and the public at large. In other
3 words, this is what happens when you commit thP.se kind

__.,c
..

3 , 19-2524, because you didn't participate in that. We
4 I don't have a mental health assessment because you
. 5 didn't participate in that, and I will •• though I
: 6 lhink there is still some dispute about this under
i 7 Idaho law, I've always taken the position that you have
8 the right to remain silent, and that's what I told you
9 ; at the time of·· when I ordered those things, and I do
10' not in any way hold that against you. That's your
11 constitutional right. Unfortunately, there's also a
: 12 consequence to that. That means that I don't have all
i 13 the Information that I'd like to have. So the
' 14 detriment of you doing that is that it may or may not
15 have hurt you in this case.
16'
What I really know about Scott Andrus is what
17 I learned at the trial in this case. You're an
, 1fl alcoholic, admitted. You have mental health problems,
119 bipolar, admitted. You have a very good command of the
20 English language. Watched you testify, listened to you
21 today. I think you're a very talented individual, and
22! I think you are a very smart Individual. I know that
23 you are on tough times right now. Haven't worked for
24 three years. I can glean that from that testimony. I

4 j of crimes. Retribution, meaning punishment simply for
5 l punishment's sake. I could impose any sentence In this
6 1case up to ten years in the penitentiary just because I
7 : wanted to punish you, and I think I would be affirmed
8 1 on appeal for that. But I've never felt that's the
9 real correct rationale, and I just don't do that. And

10 then the good order and protection of society, which is
11 the most important factor that I have to consider.
12!
You have been through two trials in this case.
13/ I want to make this record absolutely crystal clear, I
14i do not in any way hold that against you. It's your
15 constitutional right. I understand the argument you

16 made to the jury. They didn't accept it. Maybe they
17 would have, maybe they wouldn't, but they didn't. But
18 they found you guilty, and I will adjudge you guilty of
From your comments,
20! it sounds like you're going to appeal it. That's fine.
21il That's your legal right, and we can talk about that
22 here in o second.
23
We have talked about the fact that you did not
24 participate in the presentence investigation interview.

19:this crime based on that verdict.

25_Y_o_u_m_
u~. h=_'ome because they've got some lntormation

_ __
~
·· = = = = =
62=!
31
1 ~ hlsc~fse, altiel fsome apparently incorrect. We
2 j ?~n't have a GAIN evaluation, what is required by
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25 know that you have taken someefforls to IJy to help

1

·---~sJ

1 yourself by going through the programs mIfie Jaif,ana
2 I think that's commendable. I'm not sure what that
means. I don't know what it means to graduate from any
4 ! of these classes, whether that means just simply
51sining there listening to somebody all day long or
6 I c1clually pc1rlicipaling. And that's 011e of the
7 ; troubling parts of this case because the issue of
8 ! trying to deal with addicts is a very, very complicated
9 ; issue for me. I have to try to determine whether
10 somebody is really committed to the point of wanting to
11 change their life so that they don't come back before
12 the Court again.
13,
I'mnot going to waste your t!me or anybody
14; else's time talking about the difficulty of DUls and
15i the consequences to society. You know thc1t.
161
This cAse has an Aggravating factor in it in
17! that your conduct on the day in question caused a lot
18: of problems. Any time police officers in this
19: community get a suicide call to the Perrine Bridge,
20[ that's a big deal. Nobody wants that to happen. I
21 I don't want that to happen, Madam Prosecutor certainly
221doesn't. Nobody wants somebody to take their life.
23 I'm glad that it worked out that that wasn't the case.
Bui it goes to the heart of what I'm about to
2{
251get to. And that is exactly what Ms. Harrington

, 1 1 aaoresseo m fier closing argument or her arguments.
I 21You are a manipulative person because that entire, that
entire episode was nothing but manipulation. That's of
4 , great concern to me. I think you are the type of
• 5 ' Individual who will justify anything to get to an
' 6 objective. Just the words you used today lo me tells
7 me that you are rationalizing everything you do in
8 1 life, Whether you're wearing rellglon on your sleeve
9 i or not, I don't know. That's your choice, not mine.
! 10
What I have to be concerned about is this:
111 When I am finished today and walk out of this courtroom
112 and go home tonight, whether I put you on probation, a
13 1retained jurisdiction, or send you to the penitentiary,
1 14'. can I sleep good tonight because I know that this
15 comrnunily is protected c19c1i11st you doing exactly the
16 same thing that you just did thAI got you before this
17 1 Court? I'll tell you right now I have no comfort
18 ! level, Mr. Andrus, as to what will happen. I don't
19' trust you.
; 20
Clearly you're not going on probation today.
21 I realize you have been in the county jail for 266
22 days. You know, the normal DUI case that I see for
23 somebody with your record -- let me segue for just a
; 24 minute. i place no weight, whatsoever, on the Nevada
25 charge. Okay? I don't know anything about that ca~

3.
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I

1 Tdon'tkii-owTiie circumstances, -it's not been------ - - 2 : documented. You haven't been convicted, so I want to
3 : make it clcor agoin, that's not in play here. Okay?
4J You're getting sentenced on what I have seen in the
5 course of two trials and what I can glean from your
6 j testimony and my observations of you and the very
7 : limited information in this presentence investigation
8 : report.
9
I don't think you have come to accept
10 responsibility for what you've done here. Mr. Williams
11 1 is telling me, I think, in his argument, if I send you
12i on the retained Jurisdiction program, he's concerned
13 that you will essentially do what you've done through
14 the sentencing process here and that the Department of
15! Corrections is going to say, relinquish Mr. Andrus. I
16, don't know if that's going to happen or not.
17;
There are two things, in my view, that
181retained jurisdictions do. One, it's to help ·- well,
19 part of it's punishment. Okay? And I see so many
20: cases, particularly in drug and alcohol cases, where
21 f individuals just need a period of forced sobriety, and
22 the retained jurisdiction does that. I don't think you
?3 need lht1I in this case. You're ?66 days of forced
24 sobriety.

25: _

13,

....~,~~-5-econd thing is that to educate defendants

,

i

-i

. I 1 f aoo-ut wnere tney've oeen in tneir hie, where tney're
' 2 · going, what they ·· how they need to rethink things
i 3 because I sec so many, particularly young people, who
14 have been brought up in an environment where they
5 ! haven't had the right guidance that most people, normal
, 6 i people, whatever that might be, have. I don't think we
! 7 need that for you either. You're of age here where
8 you've seen a whole lot more in life than most of us in
9 . this courtroom.
10;
The third reason for riders is to evaluate
! 11 people, find out what they're really thinking. I don't
1
12 think I need that in this case either. I've evaluated
131you. As I just said, I think you rationallze
14· everyfhing you do. I don't think you are prepared to
: 15 change. and I am not going to take the risk, I'm not
' 16 going to take the risk that someday probation should be
17 1 allowed to you. I'm going to leave that up to the
1a· parole board.
, 19
It is the judgment of the Court that I order
· 20 that you pay court costs as required by statute and
21 rule. You are required to provide a DNA sample and a
22 right thumbprint at a cost of $100 to you. I'm going
?.3 to order public defender restitution in this case in an
! 24 amount of $2,500 for the cost of going through trials.

I

i

,1·
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125:I realize you're not in a posil-io_n_to_t_ak_e_c_a,_e_of-th_a_t_

2

!]

!2

_ .___

1[foday. You will someday. Ano I'm going to orde{a ---·

; 1 sir, or transport tot e penitentiary system.

. 2 luck to you.
(End of proceedings at 2:57 p.m.)
I3:

2 , penitentiary sentence of two years fixed, eight years
~

j indeterminate, to be served in this case.
Specifically rejecting probation. I am
5 : rejecting a rider. I want to tell you why I am doing
6 : that, Mr. Andrus: Because you talked me into doing
7 1 that today. Your allocution convinced me that you are
8 not ready for either probation or riders. You did it
9 1to yourself.
10;
Iwill order a license suspension of two
11 · years, absolute, following release from incarceration,
1? followed by a two-year interlock requirement under the
13 statute. You do you have the right to --you of
14 j course, will be given credit for time served in this
15: case.
161
Do you agree, Madam Prosecutor, it's 266 days?
17;
MS. HARRINGTON: I have no reason to argue
18: with that.
19'
THE COURT: We'll actually put that in this
201order that that's the amount of credit for time served.
21 I
You are remanded - if you wish to appeal this
22j decision, you must perfect that appeal within 42 days
23/ of today. Notify Mr. Williams. He will perfect that
241appeal.

41

25L__ '. will r~mand your custody to the sheriff~---

!

41

·000·

.~I
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APPENDIX B

DISTRICT COURT
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Fifth Judicial District

County t1f Tl'dn Falls • Stalo of ldlho

DEC 3 O2014
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I
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2014-2897

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S

vs.

I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A

LAWRENCE scon ANDRUS ,

HEARING

Defendant.
The Defendant, Lawrence Scott Andrus, was sentenced on December 5, 2014
following the return of a guilty verdict for one count of Operating a Motor Vehicle Wh!le
Under the Influence of Alcohol. The Court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, which
was comprised of a fixed period of confinement of two years, followed by an indeterminate
eight-year period of custody. On December 15, 2014, the Defendant flied this Motion
pursuant to I.C.R. 35 asking the Court to reconsider or reduce the imposed sentence.
The Defendant's Motion also includes a request for oral argument In this matter, as well
as an Affidavit of Lawrence Scott Andrus in support of the Motion.
A Rule 35 motion may challenge a sentence as being excessive, unduly severe,
and/or unreasonable at the time it was originally imposed. State v. Jensen, 137 Idaho 240
(Ct.App.2002). A Rule 35 Motion to reduce a legally imposed sentence is essentially a
plea for leniency and is directed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Where a
sentence as originally imposed is not illegal, the defendant has the burden to show that it
is unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393
(1992).

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING - 1
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Idaho Criminal Rule 35 states in part:
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the filing of a
judgment of conviction or within 120 days after the court releases
retained jurisdiction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon
revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days
after the filing of the order revoking probation. Motions to correct or modify
sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the
judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction and
shall be considered and determined by the court without the

admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless
otherwise ordered by the court In Its discretion; provided, however that
no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of
sentence under this Rule.
(emphasis added). When a defendant does not identify what evidence she might have
produced at a hearing that she could not have been produced through affidavits, the
district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a hearing on his Rule 35
motion. State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830 (Ct.App.1992). Nevertheless, it is error for the
court to refuse to consider additional Information submitted after sentencing. State v.

Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 557, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988).
The Defendant does not allege that the Court imposed an illegal sentence.
Rather, the Motion considered herein acknowledges that it is a request for leniency
wherein the Defendant requests that the Court reduce the Imposed sentence. The
attached Affidavit of the Defendant in support of this request sets forth numerous
reasons why the Defendant believes that the sentence imposed by the Court is
unwarranted and should be reduced. Such reasons include the Defendant's "empirical
knowledge" of the sentences received by other offenders for the same crime for which
the Defendant was convicted and the Defendant's belief that the imposed sentence is
unjustified based upon his lack of a felony criminal record; statements made by the
prosecutor at the time of sentencing that the Defendant characterizes as "religious

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S !.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING - 2
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persecution;" the introduction of hearsay statements attributable to the Defendant's
brother by the prosecutor at the time of sentencing; the lack of weight that the Court
placed upon the Defendant's prior "civil contributions and volunteerism" and various
certificates submitted at the time of sentencing and evidencing the Defendant's
completion of various treatment program while incarcerated in the Twin Falls County
Jail; the Defendant's objection to the prosecutor and/or Court characterizing the
Defendant as "manipulative" and "deceptive;" the Defendant's contention that his nonparticipation in the presentence investigative process pursuant to his constitutional
rights was held against him by the Court; the fact that the Court imposed a sentence
under the impression that the Defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder
whereas his true mental health diagnosis was post-traumatic stress disorder; and the
Defendant's desire to change his behavior, including his consurnptio11 of alcohol, and
his remorse for "how [his] beliefs, attitudes and actions affected the safety and lives of
other persons." Despite the numerous reasons that the Defendant lists in his Affidavit in
support of his Motion, the Defendant has identified no evidence that he would produce
at a hearing that could not be produced through affidavit relating to these arguments.
Nor has the Defendant made any showing as to why a hearing or oral argument in this
case is warranted. Accordingly, the Court finds that a hearing on the Defendant's Motion
is unnecessary.
The Court has considered the Defendant's request for reconsideration or
reduction of the imposed sentence in light of the Affidavit In support of his Motion.
Having done so, the Court finds insufficient reason to grant leniency and alter the
sentence previously Imposed in any manner. At the sentencing hearing In this case, the

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING ~ 3
332

3

0
Court found that the Defendant had not come to accept responsibility for the criminal
conduct resulting in his conviction and that he was not prepared to change. Despite the
numerous extrinsic factors that the Defendant contends were either improperly
considered or not considered by the Court in rendering its sentencing decision, the
Court made clear that it gave no consideration to the Defendant's non-participation in
the presentence investigation process and that its finding was based primarily upon its
perceptions of the Defendant from courtroom interactions related to this case. The Court
has considered thA Defendant's representation in his Affidavit regarding his mental
health diagnosis. However, whether the Defendant Is diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder or bipolar disorder, such diagnosis does not alter the Court's perception
regarding the Defendant's failure to accept responsibility for his conduct. Moreover,
despite Defendant's statements in his Affidavit that he does, in fact, desire a change
with regard to his use of alcohol and that he is sorry for tho conduct loading to his
conviction in this case, such statements are unpersuasive to the Court given that its
overall perception of the Defendant's attitude was formulated over the course of
numerous court proceedings, Including two jury trials, since the Defendant's first
appearance before the Court on June 6, 2014.
Based on the review performed by this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr.

ry

Andrus's Rule 35 Motion is DENIED WITHOUT HEARING.

DATED this

of December 2014.
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